Posthuman disability studies by Goodley, D. et al.
	



	


	

	
				
 !

∀

#∃%∃	
&∃∃∋()∗+,−.
	&/	#	
0/1		#∃ 2,324+5006+ !!342,+
		7

8+∗+∗! /∗+,+!
	






	9	

				

This is the final author version of Goodley, D., Lawthom R. and Runswick-Cole, K. 
(in press). Posthuman disability studies. Subjectivity.  
[The final version will be published in the journal Subjectivity late 2014, Gold Open 
Access. Please take direct quotes from the published paper which can be found at:  
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/sub/index.html]. 
We will upload the full pdf published version by the end of 2014. 
++++ 
Posthuman disability studies  
Dan Goodley*, Rebecca Lawthom** and Katherine Runswick Cole**  
* University of Sheffield, School of Education, 388 Glossop Road, Sheffield S10 
2TA  
** Manchester Metropolitan University, Department of Psychology, Gaskell Campus, 
Hathersage Road, M13 0JA.  
Correspondence: d.goodley@shef.ac.uk; r.lawthom@mmu.ac.uk; k.runswick- 
cole@mmu.ac.uk 
Dan Goodley is Professor of Disability Studies and Education at the University of 
Sheffield. Recent texts include Dis/ability Studies (Routledge, 2014) and Disability 
Studies (Sage, 2011). His work engages critical studies of ableism and disablism to 
interrogate the gains and losses of those working at the dis/ability complex. 
 
Rebecca Lawthom is Professor of Community Psychology at Manchester 
Metropolitan University. Her work engages at the intersections of feminism, disability 
and migration. Publications include Community Psychology (Wiley Blackwell, 2011, with 
Kagan, Burton and Duckett) and Qualitative Methods in Psychology: A research guide (Open 
University Press, 2012, with Banister, Bunn, Burman, Daniels, Duckett, Parker, 
Runswick Cole, Sixsmith and Goodley). 
 
Katherine Runswick-Cole is Senior Research Fellow in Disability Studies and 
Psychology at Manchester Metropolitan University, UK. Her research and 
publications focus on the lives of disabled children and their families, this includes 
Disabled Children’s Childhood Studies (2013, Palgrave, edited with Tillie Curran) and 
Approaching disability: Critical issues and perspectives (2014, Routledge, with Mallett). 
 
 
Posthuman disability studies 
Abstract 
This paper explores the human through critical disability studies and the theories of Rosi 
Braidotti. We ask: what does it mean to be human in the 21st Century and in what ways does 
disability enhance these meanings? In addressing this question we seek to work through 
entangled connections of nature, society, technology, medicine, biopower and culture to 
consider the extent to which the human might be an outdated phenomenon, replaced by 
Braidotti’s posthuman condition. We then introduce disability as a political category, an 
identity and a moment of relational ethics. Critical disability studies, we argue, are perfectly at 
ease with the posthuman because disability has always contravened the traditional classical 
humanist conception of what it means to be human. Disability also invites a critical analysis 
of the posthuman. We examine the ways in which disability and posthuman work together, 
enhancing and complicating one another in ways that raise important questions about the 
kinds of life and death we value. We consider three of Braidotti’s themes in relation to 
disability: I. Life beyond the self: Rethinking enhancement; II. Life beyond the species: 
Rethinking animal; III. Life beyond death: Rethinking death. We conclude by advocating a 
posthuman disability studies that responds directly to contemporary complexities around the 
human whilst celebrating moments of difference and disruptioni. 
(1) Introduction: Have you ever been human? 
‘Not all of us can say, with any degree of certainty, that we have always been human, 
or that we are only that. Some of us are not even considered fully human now, let 
alone at previous moments of Western social, political and scientific history 
(Braidotti, 2013: 1).  
 
This quote kick-starts Rosi Braidotti’s text and initiates a key task of her book: to 
target/secure the problem/possibility of the post/human. The human, as it is classically 
understood, is a self-aggrandising, abstract ideal and symbol of classical humanity that was 
born in Europe ‘predicated on eighteenth and nineteenth-century renditions of classical 
Antiquity and Italian Renaissance ideals’ (Ibid: 13) and shaped, more recently, through 
modernist and capitalist mouldings. ‘Humanity’ Braidotti (2013: 24) notes, ‘is very much a 
male of the species: it is a he’. Moreover, ‘he is white, European, handsome and able-bodied’ 
(Braidotti, 2013: 24), ‘an ideal of bodily perfection’ (Ibid: 13), ‘implicitly assumed to be 
masculine, white, urbanized, speaking a standard language, heterosexually inscribed in a 
reproductive unit and a full citizen of a recognised polity’ (Ibid: 65), ‘a rational animal 
endowed with language’ (Ibid: 141). This means that while all citizens are humans ‘some or 
more mortal than others’ (Ibid: 15) and, conversely, some are more disposable than others. 
This humanism has a Eurocentric core and Imperialist tendencies, meaning that many of 
those outside of Europe (including many in the colonies) became known as less than human 
or inhuman.  
 
To this, of course, critical disability studies scholars would add humanism’s convenient 
relationship with medicalisation and psychologisation as colonizing tendencies of the body 
and psyche. ‘The disabled’ and the ‘Non-Europeans’ (grouped as homogeneous categories) 
become known in terms of what they are not. Humanism’s arrogant centering of classical 
‘man’ fitted directly with what Lacan (1977) would term a mis-recognition of self-
determination and authority. And this authoritative humanist ideal is one that people rarely 
match up to you.  Nevertheless, Braidotti acknowledges a number of emancipatory offerings 
of humanism. These include civil rights based upon definitions of humanity; normative legal 
systems respecting the right to live as a human being and pan-national declarations 
cherishing this phenomenon called the human. We could cite here, for example, the 
opportunities for humanist recognition offered by the  
. Braidotti does, though, remain antagonistic towards 
humanism’s rigidity and narrowness, which invites some into its fold whilst banishing others. 
We share this view. She aligns herself with poststructuralists (like Foucault and Derrida), 
postcolonialists (Fanon and Shiva) and feminist philosophers (including Irigaray, Kristeva 
and Butler) and shares their deconstructive desires to destabilise humanist man. One way in 
which she differs from these thinkers is her tendency to think affirmatively rather than 
negatively. Instead of identifying hopelessness she asks; what productive alternatives might 
emerge in response to the oppressive nature of humanism? Deconstructing existing frames 
of humanity need not lead to despair nor nihilism but an affirmative positionality. This 
stance is rooted in her accessible and politicised use of Deleuze and Guattari (e.g. 1987) and 
carried forward in reference to (and dialogue with) contemporaries such as Donna Haraway, 
Elizabeth Grosz and Achille Mbembe. Braidotti acknowledges risks but also, crucially, 
identifies theoretical, political and artistic opportunities.  She is clear, humans are not so 
easily recognisable today; they have to find their selves in the ‘complexity of contemporary 
science, politics and international relations’ (p2) which include debates, developments and 
controversies relating to ‘robotics, prosthetic technologies, neuroscience and bio-genetic 
capital … [through to] fuzzier new age visions of trans-humanism’ (Ibid: 2). Like it or not; 
new technologies mean that we live in very different times to those of our ancestors. These 
new times we might define as ‘the posthuman condition’, times that ‘urge us to think 
critically and creatively about who and what we are actually in the process of becoming’ 
(Ibid: 12). This condition, she accepts, ‘provokes elation but also anxiety … about the 
possibility of a serious decentring of ‘man’; the former measure of things’ (Ibid).  
 
Like poststructuralists and postmodernists before her, Braidotti is clear: the old modernist 
idealisation of the unitary, rational, independent, dislocated, solitary, able-bodied human 
subject has been revealed as a fiction. The self, subject, person, citizen, the human – each of 
these individualised entities – is now firmly interconnected, plugged into and caught up in 
the ever growing whirlpool of capital, technology, communication that shift us through real 
and virtual places and spaces. The 21st Century citizen is a ‘knowing subject’ with the 
potential to ‘free us from the provincialism of the mind, the sectarianism of ideologies, the 
dishonesty of grandiose posturing and the grip of fear’ (Ibid: 11). A recurring anxiety 
expressed by Braidotti, throughout the text, is that social theory is in danger of lagging 
behind the many posthuman transformations already occurring everyday across the globe. 
And they all leave from a point of departure: humanism.  
 
Braidotti (2013: 29) acknowledges that ‘one touches humanism at one’s risk and peril’ (Ibid: 
29) and ‘rejecting the enlightenment legacy would be inherently contradictory for any critical 
project (Ibid: 36). Humanism, she acknowledges, has supported liberal notions of autonomy, 
responsibility, self-determination, solidarity, community-bonding, social justice and 
principles of equality (Ibid: 29). These practices remain important, especially for those 
groups of society who have, in the words of Braidotti, never been known as human. 
Disabled people have historically been excluded from the category of the human and 
continue to demand inclusion into this category.  Hence, we are not suggesting in this paper 
to give up on the functional utility of human rights nor the social justice of liberal principles 
of equality in our fight to challenge disablism (the exclusion of people with impairments 
from mainstream society). There is of course a time and place for humanism: especially 
when such a register remains the commonsensical and dominant way of thinking about the 
human. We will return to this consideration later on in the paper. We also recognise, though, 
that these humanist offerings come at a price: they are hegemonically enshrined through a 
marking of those that count as human and those that do not. This epistemic violence of 
humanism, which reduces certain non-Western others to sub-human status, ‘is a constitutive 
source of ignorance, falsity and bad consciousness for the dominant subject who is 
responsible for their epistemic as well as social dehumanization’ (Ibid: 28). It is also a 
common practice of Global North social scientific research (Teo, 2010). ‘Humanism’s 
universalism, primacy of rationality, the unitary subject’ (Braidotti, 2013: 31) is the white 
man’s burden where women ‘were assigned to the pole of un-reason, passions and emotions, 
keeping them in the private sphere’ (Ibid: 34). The humanist subject defines himself as much 
by ‘what he is excluded from’ and defends himself through a violent and belligerent reaction 
to ‘the sexualised, racialised and naturalised others that occupied the slot of devalued 
difference’ (Ibid: 144). For some of these others (or perhaps we should say Others), being 
human already feels alien; ‘because my sex, historically speaking, never quite made it into full 
humanity, so my allegiance to that category is at best negotiable and never to be taken for 
granted’ (Braidotti, 2013: 81). 
 
We see similar parallels with the historical disavowal of disabled people. ‘For me’, Braidotti 
reflects, ‘it is impossible, both intellectually and ethically, to disengage the positive elements 
of Humanism from their problematic counterparts: individualism breeds egotism and self-
centredness; self-determination can turn to arrogance and domination; and science is not 
free from its own dogmatic tendencies’ (2013: 30). We seek to take up the challenge set by 
Braidotti’s (2013:153) to ‘find the courage to move beyond an exclusive concern for the 
human … and to embrace more planetary intellectual challenges’.  
 
This not only means shifting how we understand the human but also rethinking our 
relationships with our environments, our world and human and non-human inhabitants of 
our planet. And doing this rethinking through disability. The shift back and forth between 
humanism and anti-humanism has endlessly occupied theorists and activists. Instead, 
Braidotti demands, we need to think again: to desire ‘posthumanism as a move beyond these 
lethal binaries’ (Ibid: 37). Posthuman ways of being and becoming reshape the identity of 
humanistic practices by ‘stressing heteronomy and multi-faceted relationality, instead of 
autonomy and self-referential disciplinary purity’ (Ibid: 145). Disability, too, encourages such 
reshaping.  
 
(2) The posthuman condition 
 
[T]he proper study of the posthuman condition is the posthuman itself. This new 
knowing subject is a complex assemblage of human and non-human, planetary and 
cosmic, given and manufactured, which requires major re-adjustments in our way of 
thinking (Braidotti, 2013: 159) 
 
Were one to take a glance across Braidotti’s body of work (1994, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2013) a 
discernable philosophical contribution to social theory and activism resides in her willingness 
to remain upbeat and imaginative about a future post-human. The crisis of humanism (the 
realisation, as we see it, that we all fail to dance to the beat of the ableist drum associated 
with ideal/ised ‘big Subject of Man’) means that ‘structural others of the modernist 
humanistic subject re-emerge with a vengeance’ (Braidotti, 2013: 37). The great 
‘emancipatory movements of postmodernity’ (Ibid: 37) have their ‘fires stoked by structural 
others such as the pro-environment, anti-nuclear, anti-globalisation’ and, we would add, 
disability movements. Each has the potential to engage in ‘a radical estrangement from 
notions like moral rationality, unitary identity, transcendent consciousness or innate and 
universal moral value’ (Ibid: 92). Let us now introduce three key theoretical moves of 
Braidotti’s 2013 The Posthuman. 
 
The first relates to life beyond the self  and the need for a new theory of the human subject that 
‘takes stock of the posthuman turn and hence acknowledges the decline of Humanism’ (Ibid: 
51). This decline should be celebrated because it opens up the self as an extended, 
distributed, interconnected and relational entity ‘embodied and embedded’ (Ibid: 51). A 
posthuman subject embraces ‘affirmative politics’ which combine ‘critique with creativity’ in 
the pursuit of alternative ways of living with one another. Continental philosophy of the late 
20th Century is characterised by Braidotti as creating valued and othered versions of the self. 
The time is ripe for refiguring and reconfiguring the self. What it means to be a reflexive self 
seeks to end a ‘parochial’ notion of the self (born and bred in Western European and North 
American, White Anglo Saxon Protestant contexts) and embrace ‘renewed claims to 
community and belonging by singular subjects who have taken the critical distance from 
humanist individualism’ (Ibid; 39). In emerging out of the confines of anti/humanism, 
Braidotti (2006, 2013) offers a process-oriented political ontology. Rather than conceptualising 
ontology as an internalised phenomenon of an individual subject, we are asked to think of 
the kinds of connection between and within one another. Hence, the posthuman turn is a 
move ‘beyond lethal boundaries’ (Ibid: 37). Here ‘the crisis of humanism means that the 
structural others of the modern humanistic subject re-emerge with a vengeance’ (Ibid: 37), 
creating ‘other visions of the self’ (Ibid: 38), ‘experimenting with new models of the self’, 
devising ‘renewed claims to community and belonging by singular subjects who have taken 
critical distance from humanist individualism’ (Ibid: 39), stressing a ‘radical relationality, non-
unitary identities and multiple allegiances’ (Ibid: 144). This is a self beyond its traditional 
fixed moorings; a posthuman self.  
  
The second, life beyond the species, directly contests anthropocentrism that puts humanist man 
(anthropos) before other species and the environment (as an egocentrism). Humanism 
situates anthropos as elite species, occupying a sovereign position. A posthuman turn 
challenges such elitism, reminding us that the superior human ideal is of course only that; a 
utopian ideal. Moreover, the pure organic entity that was anthropos has now been 
‘technological mediated to an unprecedented order’ (Ibid: 57) subjected to ‘the four 
horsemen of the posthuman apocalypse: nanotechnology, biotechnology, information 
technology and cognitive science’ (Ibid: 59). The human species has become expanded, 
meaning that ‘the boundaries between ‘Man’ and his others go tumbling down, in a cascade 
effect that opens up unexpected perspective …. relinquishing the demonic forces of the 
naturalised others’ (Ibid: 66-67).  These others include animals, insects, plants, environment 
and the cosmos as a whole. For Braidotti, posthumanity moves beyond the species (and the 
speciesism or anthropomorphism of humanism), freeing up solidarities with non-humans 
including animals and the wider natural environment. Post-anthropocentricism is the 
posthuman response. There is more to life than the human being. 
 
Theme three, life beyond death, pushes Braidotti to consider the centrality of death to any 
theorisation of life. A posthuman analysis is mindful of the biopolitical apparatus that 
mobilise ‘not only generative forces but also new and subtler degrees of death and extinction’ 
(Ibid: 115). Here we can think of drug treatments, prostheses, genetic testing, and the human 
genome project that seek to enhance life but also are often working alongside death. Indeed, 
she notes, ‘a whole under-class of socially under-insured disposable bodies is engendered 
both within the Western world and in the emerging economies’ (Ibid: 118). The biopolitics 
of life now includes not simply ‘errant humans’ (think the mad, disabled, deviant) but the 
nonhuman (animal, mineral, machine). And key to the maintenance of a healthy population 
is the political, cultural and social necessity to identify those who are dying, unhealthy and 
facing degeneracy. Hence, biopower involves the management of lives that are living (Zoë-
politics) and lives that are dying (necro-politics). We are, then, entering a time of 
thanatopolitics (Rose, 2001) in our late biopolitical times that raise huge questions around 
the kinds of living lives and dying lives that we denigrate or value. The posthuman condition, 
for Braidotti, is as much about death as it is about life: ‘bio-power and necro-politics are two 
sides of the same coin’ (Braidotti, 2013: 122). We need to value (our relationships with) 
death as much as we do life.  
 
Let us now consider how these theoretical moves resonate and connect with our distinct 
political and theoretical interests, which we associate with critical disability studies. 
 
(3) Enter critical disability studies  
 
The fast-changing field of disability studies is almost emblematic of the posthuman 
predicament. Ever mindful that we do not yet know what a body can do, disability 
studies combine the critique of normative bodily models with the advocacy of new, 
creative models of embodiment’ (Bradotti, 2013: 146). 
 
Braidotti’s passing reference to disability studies recognises at least acknowledges the 
promise of disability to exemplify the posthuman. Our analysis fits well with the emerging 
scholarship and activism of the critical disability studies field which we read as questioning 
traditional and normative understandings of the human individual and, as way of response, 
offering new, collectivist and crip alternatives that fit well with the posthuman manifesto 
outlined by scholars such as Braidotti and Haraway (e.g. McRuer, 2006; Campbell, 2009; 
Shildrick, 2009, 2012; Meekosha and Shuttleworth, 2009; Goodley, 2007, 2011, 2013; Kafer, 
2013; Slater, 2013; Liddiard, 2012, 2014; Mallett and Runswick Cole, 2014; Feely, 2014). 
People with physical, sensory or cognitive impairments are plugged into a myriad of cultural, 
professional, disciplinary and political practices that shape their embodied selves and inter-
relationships with the world. One common theme of critical disability studies is that 
disability necessarily demands and affirms interdependent connections with other humans, 
technologies, non-human entities, communication streams and people and non-peopled 
networks. Disability is but one cultural artifact that signifies the ‘demise of humanism’ 
(Braidotti, 2013: 151) precisely because disability demands non-normative and anti-
establishment ways of living life. To use the language of McRuer (2006), disability crips what 
it means to be a human being. Quite simply, disability complicates the myopic perspective 
and non-representative nature offered by humanism. Our sitpoint is that disability is the 
quintessential posthuman condition: because it calls for new ontologies, ways of relating, 
living and dying. Posthuman and critical disability studies share an antithetical attitude 
towards the taken-for-granted, ideological and normative under-girdings of what it means to 
be a valued citizen of society. 
 
Take for example McLaughlin et al’s (2008) study of disabled babies and their families. All 
the babies represented had extensive relational networks, most starkly captured by the baby 
with the label of Down’s syndrome who by the age of one had had contact with over 120 
health, social care and educational professionals. When Braidotti (2013) calls for a politics of 
becoming predicated on ‘interdependence with multiple other’ (Ibid: 101) she could be 
speaking about those relationships demanded of and by those working at the face of the 
disability complex. If the posthuman condition is characterised by assemblages that connect 
the subject to her/his outsides (Ibid: 165) then disability allows us to think across binaries of 
self/other, nature/technology and human/machine. We do not readily nor unquestionably 
accept 120 professional-child connections. Instead, through recognising their 
interconnection, we consider the value and worth of these lines of interaction. Why are 
professionals tied up with children? To what ends and for what service? What kinds of 
desirous or disgusting offerings are opened up by these inter-relationships? What kinds of 
disciplinary practices are evoked? As Feely (2014) has demonstrated; turning our attention to 
the details of disability assemblages allows us to ask important questions about power, 
authority and resistance.  
Occupying a posthuman position requires ‘the knowing subject disengaging itself from the 
dominant normative vision of the self’ becoming ‘relational in a complex manner that 
connects it to multiple others’ (Ibid: 167). Critical disability studies analyses have already 
made these conceptual moves though this has not come without debateii.  Who has the 
moral, political or ethical right to trouble the human? Should the activist or the theorist be 
leading these debates? What of those theorists that ignore the very fact that disabled people 
have never been permitted to occupy the category of the human? Does the posthuman 
advocate ignore the power of humanist ideals of independence, choice, autonomy and 
associated human rights at his/her peril? Is a turn to the posthuman yet another examples of 
a theoretical fancy on the part of an academic that is divorced from everyday fights with 
oppression (Graby and Greenstein, 2013)?  Disability scholars and activists have long made 
the point that disabled people are denied access to being human: a reality for many of one 
Billion disabled people across the world. Indeed, people with the label of intellectual 
disabilities have long embraced People First as their slogan and disabled young people 
continue to fight under the mantra of independence; choosing to redefine rather than 
abandon this word (Slater, 2013). While beyond the scope of this paper, we want to 
acknowledge that many disabled people work either side of the dis/ability and 
posthuman/human binaries whilst enacting their politics (see for further discussion 
Goodley, 2014; Goodley and Runswick Cole, in press)iii.  
While these contrary tensions remain – and we would argue should remain as what Puar 
(2012: 50) terms points of friction – critical disability studies scholars have emphasised the 
ways in which disability urges us to think again, anew and afresh in productive ways about 
the (post) human. Indeed, families of disabled children have demonstrated the importance of 
collective support in enhancing the lives of children rather than dwelling on individualised 
autonomy (Ryan and Runswick Cole, 2008). While the political work of disability 
organisations such as People First – the international activist movement of people associated 
with the label of intellectual disabilities – has demonstrated that competence is a distributed 
phenomenon rather than an individualised trait (e.g. Williams and Shoultz, 1982). Disability, 
then, emerges in these contemporary (posthuman) times as a moment of relational ethics: 
urging us to think again about how we are all made through our connections with others and 
encouraging us to embrace ways of love and life that are not rigidly framed by humanistic 
values of independence and autonomy (exemplified we would argue in the recent work of 
Liddiard, 2012, 2014; Titchkosky, 2014). Critical disability studies projects are, we would 
suggest, entirely commensurate with theories of the posthuman. Our sense is that a careful, 
nuanced and adapted use of Braidotti can affirmatively articulate the ways in which we might 
become posthuman through disability. After all ‘the human is a normative convention, 
which does not make it inherently negative, just highly regulatory and hence instrumental to 
practices of exclusion and discrimination. The human norm stands for normality, normalcy 
and normativity’ (Braidotti, 2013: 26). And we organise our educational systems around the 
normative human (Boxall, 2013). Too often, families are fighting for their disabled children 
to be recognised. Families in search of community and educational inclusion call upon anti-
discriminatory legislation, UN Rights, school policies and educational mandates. No doubt 
these fights will go on. Inevitably, because of an ever expanding form of globalised disablism, 
agitations around rights associated with anthropos will have to be made. The humanist 
human and his rights will be evoked. But alongside these battles are the other everyday 
negotiations, performances, lobbying, debates, embodiments, relationalities, emotionalities 
and recognitions that are enacted by families in their communities. These posthuman 
practices are equally of importance. They ask us to think again about the kinds of human 
beings we are and the kinds of humans we value, accept, include and permit to thrive. The 
posthuman is already there in our contemporary world, circulating in a general sense in ‘our 
globally linked and technologically mediated societies’ (Ibid: 5).  Rethinking interactions 
between humans and non-humans on a relational and ‘planetary scale’ (Ibid: 6) with the 
potential for ‘collectively shared, community-based praxis’ (Ibid: 100), an ‘accountable 
recomposition of a missing people’ (Ibid: 100) fit with the tenets of critical disability studies. 
 
(4) Three disabled posthuman possibilities  
We now turn to three theoretical strands of Braidotti’s (2013) book that illuminate key 
elements of a posthuman turn relating to the self, the species and death/life.  
 
I. Life beyond the self: Rethinking enhancement 
For Braidotti, (2013: 35) matter is not dialectically opposed to culture, nor to technological 
mediation, but continuous with them. Contemporary science and biotechnologies affect the 
very fibre and structure of the living and have ‘altered dramatically our understanding of 
what counts as the basic frame of reference for the human today’ (Ibid: 40). We have 
entered, she suggests, the epoch of ‘panhumanity’ where each and everything is 
technologically mediated. The question is not: should we be enhanced by technology, the 
question should be something along the lines of: what ontological, ethical and political 
questions are raised by our technological enhancement? When we think of enhancement we 
are plunged into the shiny, sexy world of sci-fi and cyborgs. Bio-techno worlds are, indeed, 
desirable utopias and, for many, everyday realities. As the British musician Damon Albarn 
recently observed, we are ‘everyday robots’, plugged into the global information 
superhighway by our smartphones and our relentless use of social media, rebooting our 
selves and our bodies. On the other side, we have the less desirable aspects of human 
enhancement, rightly tackled in the work of Wolbring (2009, 2012), who worries away at the 
ableism rife within the transhumanist movement: 
 
Disabled people using the latest assistive technologies, with their eyes fixed on 
medical progress, are a natural constituency for transhumanism. Disabled people in 
the wealthier industrialized countries, with their wheelchairs, prosthetic limbs, novel 
computing interfaces and portable computing, are the most technologically 
dependent humans ever known, and are aggressive in their insistence on their rights 
to be technologically assisted in fully participating in society … Probably the most 
prominent symbol of disabled transhumanist activism these days is Christopher 
Reeve, the former Superman actor who became a tireless campaigner for biomedical 
research after a horse-riding accident left him quadriplegic. Reeve has been especially 
important defending the use of cloned embryos in stem cell research, and his 
advocacy of cures for spinal injuries has made him controversial for the disability 
rights extremism who see a zero-sum trade-off between disability rights and cures for 
disabilities … But most disabled people are not Luddites. Most disabled people think 
parents should have the freedom to choose to have non-disabled children and that 
technology can be used to overcome or cure disabilities, while we fight for equality 
for people with disabilities. Just as we should have the choice to get rid of a 
disability, we should also have the right to choose not to be “fixed,” and to choose 
to live with bodies that aren’t “normal.” The right not to be coerced by society to 
adopt a “normal” body is also a central demand of transhumanism 
(http://transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/communities/physicallydisabled/)  
 
We share Wolbring’s (2009, 2012) concerns about a movement that appears to want to wish 
away disability. But far removed from this techno-ableist speak, might disability force us to 
think of human enhancement in other, everyday, less sinister and more productive ways?  
 
Let us reiterate and revisit Braidotti’s desires for heteronomy: action of forces outside of the 
individual that shame and move the organism in powerful ways. Braidotti seeks a ‘more 
complex and relational subject framed by embodiment, sexuality, affectivity, empathy and 
desire as core qualities’ (26)... ‘the potential of the posthuman condition as conducive to 
human enhancement’ (30). Taking up the relational subject as a core element of the potential 
of the posthuman condition to be conducive to human enhancement inevitably leads us, we 
would argue, to disability. The wheelchair user, the employer of a personal assistant, the 
blind woman walking down the street with the support of her guide dog, the augmentative 
and alternative communication user, the child labelled with Special Educational Needs who 
has the regular input of the classroom assistant, the tube-fed baby; all of these posthuman 
configurations of bio, techno, social, human, animal, community scream and boast of 
disability’s posthuman condition. It is not simply the case, as Siebers (2006) puts it, that 
disabled people have always been cyborgs; more than that, disability has always demanded to 
be recognised not as lack but possibility; an enhanced humanity, a posthumanity far beyond 
the limited figuration of the cyborg (see Reeve, 2012). Consequently, it is only right that 
critical disability studies activists and scholars are at the heart of debates around 
transhumanism and human enhancement. Critical disability studies scholars must be present 
and engaged with wider ethical debates (and we would add questions of the human) that are 
raised when we think of bio-techno-human enhancement such as gene therapies, ante-natal 
interventions and normalising forms of surgeryiv. Human and non-human linkages suggest 
complex interfaces between the ‘wetware’ of bodies and the ‘hardware’ of technologies 
(Braidotti, 2013: 145).  
 
But we must also be careful not to be seduced by shiny technology when, on a more 
mundane level, we are already potentially enhancing our humanity through a myriad of inter-
relationships. Indeed, the tied togetherness between the guide dog and human; or personal 
assistant and employer, demands us to think again about old humanist notions of agency, 
responsibility and subjectivity. Braidotti’s Deleuzian tendencies explicitly emerge when she 
reminds us that a posthuman position can no longer assume a ‘human, individualised self as 
the deciding factor of main subject’ (45). Instead, we need to envisage ‘a transversal inter-
connection or an ‘assemblage’ of human and non-human actors’ (45) all bound up in a 
project of ‘pragmatic experimentation’ (45). Let us pause here, for a moment, and think of 
the example of disabled child and mother and what each might do to one another, what they 
become together and the kinds of questions and lessons that result from their assemblage: 
 
You see, I can’t keep chasing the normal. I mean I’ve done so much to try and make 
my son normal but I can’t keep that up. ... I need to accept him in the ways that he is 
and just enjoy them and him. I must stop pressurising myself. (Rebecca Greenwood) 
(from Goodley 2007: 150). 
To be the mother of a disabled child is to be different – a mother because she 
undoubtedly has a child, yet somehow not a mother in terms of the conventional 
notions of motherhood that pervade our society (Gregory, 1991: 121: cited in Ryan 
and Runswick Cole, 2008: 203). 
Disability, as a posthuman lever, shifts mothering into an enhanced postconventionalist 
space; from being to an ethics of becoming; ‘an enlarged sense of inter-connection between self 
and others’ (Braidotti, 2013: 49) by ‘removing the obstacle of self-centred individualism’. Of 
course, parenting and mothering, each have the potential to dislodge a self-centred 
subjectivity. Disability too shares this potential for disruption and expansion. Like a fine 
recreational drug, the experience of parenting is enhanced further by disability, in ways that 
may feel heady, dizzying, confusing (and high). Braidotti (2013: 49) puts it more grandly: 
I define the critical posthuman subject within an eco-philosophy of multiple 
becomings, as a relational subject constituted in and by multiplicity, … a subject that 
works across differences and is also internally differentiated, but still grounded and 
embodied. Posthuman subjectivity expresses an embodied and embedded and hence 
partial form of accountability, based on a strong sense of collectivity, relationality 
and hence community building … an affirmative bond that locates the subject in the 
flow of relations with multiple others’ (Braidotti: 2013: 49-50)  
Disability provides fertile conditions for thinking through the posthuman notion of ‘the 
unfleshed, extended and relational self’ (Braidotti, 2013: 90), a becoming machine that ‘bears 
a privileged bond with multiple others and merges with one’s technologically mediated 
planetary environment’ (Braidotti, 2013: 92)v. Mirroring a feminist ethics of care literature, as 
disability often does (McLaughlin et al, 2088) ‘the notion of codependence replaces that of 
recognition, much as the ethics of sustainability replaces the moral philosophy of rights’ 
(Braidotti 2013: 94). Codependence is true enhancement because  ‘an ethics based on the 
primary of the relation of interdependence’ (95) values life in itself: ‘dis-unity points to over-
abundance, not lack’ (156).  
 
II. Life beyond the species: Rethinking animal  
If one of the exciting moments of the posthuman condition entails the ‘displacement of 
anthropocentrism and the recognition of trans-species solidarity’ (Braidotti, 2013: 67) then 
one need only to turn to the disability world. One of the most significant contributions of 
critical disability studies has been the dislodging and deconstruction of the fantasy of ableist 
human one-ness. Disability demands mutuality, support and interdependence. Such qualities 
are valued elements of Braidotti’s posthuman ‘not-Oneness, which is constitutive of the 
non-unitary subject anchors the subject in an ethical bond to alterity, to the multiple and 
external others that are constitutive of that entity which, out of laziness and habit, we call the 
‘self’’ (100).  If becoming animal is about displacing anthropocentricism then Rod Michalko’s 
beautiful 1999 text captures becoming animal and human together: a complex and affirming 
hybrid. Too often, Braidotti (2013: 668) writes, drawing in the work of Borges, we think of 
animals in terms of a taxonomy of three groups: those we eat, those we watch TV with and 
those we are scared of. We confine animals into a host of instrumental, Oedipal or 
phantasmagorical relationships. But how might we think again about our alliances with 
animals? One answer, clearly, is through our interconnection and vitality of bond associated 
with us sharing a planet. ‘This vital interconnection posits a qualitative shift of relationship 
away from species-ism and towards an ethical appreciation of what bodies (human, animal, 
others) can do’ (Braidotti, 2013: 71). Shildrick and Price (2004/2005) demonstrate such as an 
appreciation.  
 
The disabled woman who relies on an assistant or carer to help her prepare for a 
sexual encounter – be it in terms of dressing appropriately, negotiating toilet facilities, 
or requiring direct physical support in a comfortable sexual position – is not different 
in kind from other women, but simply engaged more overtly in just those networks 
that Deleuze and Guattari characterise as desiring production. Similarly a reliance on 
prosthetic devices - the linkages between human, animal and machine – would figure 
not as limitations but as transformative possibilities of becoming other along 
multiple lines of flight (Shildrick and Price, 2005/2006, np). 
 
Back to Michalko (1999), and his ethico-political account of life with a guide dog and 
companion animal, we are encouraged to ask; what do we ask of animals? What are our 
ethical rights to do so? How do humans and animals become together? Such questions 
resonate with a posthuman view of ‘subjectivity as an assemblage that includes non-human 
agents’ (Braidotti, 2013: 82). Human-animal relationships are inherently touching (Shildrick, 
2009) and they function to ‘break up the fantasy of unity, totality and one-ness’ (Braidotti, 
2013: 100). Animal rights, Green and Disability Politics meet in a ‘post-anthropocentric 
space, recognising the ‘inter-relation human/animal as constitutive of the identity of each’ 
(79). We are faced, as Michalko (1999) alerts us to, matters of slavery, abuse and work that 
animals are subjected to which contrast markedly with the touching moments of human-
animal interconnection (articulated well by Shildrick, 2009). 
Braidotti (2013: 89) argues that ‘the crisis of humanism inaugurates the posthuman by 
empowering the sexualised and racialised human ‘others’ to emancipate themselves from the 
dialectics of master-slave relations and this includes naturalised others such as animals’. She 
continues, ‘this hails a post-anthropocentric period of time in which alliances are made 
between humans and non-humans; ‘between the organic and the inorganic, the born and the 
manufactured, flesh and metal, electronic circuits and organic nervous systems’ (Ibid: 89).  
 
So let us think again about the animal/human relationship and, indeed, our deployment of 
the term ‘animal’ as constitutive of the human; precisely because the animal is Other to 
human. Recently, the right wing British tabloid newspaper, The Daily Mail, reported the 
following about the shocking abuse cases at Winterbourne View residential hospital, in 
Bristol; 
 
Whistle-blower at centre of 'barbaric' care home abuse exposé raised alarm last year - but was 
ignored by regulator 
The Government has ordered a report into how warnings of systematic abuse 
towards vulnerable adults at Winterbourne View residential hospital, in Bristol, were 
not acted upon by local authorities and England's social care regulator the Care 
Quality Commission (CQC) ... 
Care workers dragged vulnerable patients around like animals at the Winterbourne 
View private care home in Bristol 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1393324/Care-homes-face-dawn-raids-
Winterbourne-view-abuse-exposed.html 
 
Winterbourne shocks because humans were treated like they were animals. One assumes it 
would be doubly shocking to treat non-disabled people as if they were animals? It would 
appear that there is an unconscious human desire to view animals as less than human and in 
some cases treats certain categories of human as if they were not (i.e. Non-human = people 
with learning disabilities). This anthropocentric position upholds ‘transcendental human 
exceptionalism’ (Braidotti, 2013: 86) and has the potential to expel those others that fail to 
match up to its standards (whether they be animals or those considered lesser humans, akin 
to animals). We need a qualitative shift of our collective imaginings, or a ‘shared desire for 
transformations’ (Braidotti, 2013: 89). The problem is not that some categories of human are 
treated like animals; the problem resides in the unconscious desire of the human condition 
to treat animals in inhumane ways; and treat some humans as if they were animals. We think 
that reinvigorating discussion around human/animal relations around disability might 
provide the necessary conditions and impetus for revaluing animals and humans as sharing a 
posthuman space of becoming. 
 
III. Life beyond death: Rethinking death 
 
At the heart of my research project lies an ethics that respects vulnerability while 
actively constructing horizons of hope (Braidotti, 2013: 122). 
 
In a recent research project, we were fortunate to talk with some young disabled people who 
were living with life limiting and life threatening impairments (LL/LTIs)vi. Their perspectives 
on the value of their (short) lives were incredibly productive. They shared with us their 
concerns, worries and their sadness. They told us of how difficult their families found their 
prognoses. But crucially they also told us jokes, shared familial narratives, ambitions and 
exciting projects they were involved. They demanded that we rethink how we put together 
words such as ‘valued’, ‘quality’, ‘life’ and ‘living’. They also asked us to revisit our 
unproblematic and inherently deficit-leaning thoughts around death. Their approach to life 
and death shared much with the affirmative approach of Braidotti’s posthumanism. They got 
us to think about how we might speak positively, affirmatively and productively about death, 
disability and short lives.  
 
Jasbir Puar (2009: 165-166) proposes that all contemporary global citizens are ‘living in 
prognosis with their own debility’. Perhaps, nowhere is this more apparent than in the case 
of children and young people with LL/LTIs. If social theory, professional practice, 
community discourse or social policy speak of these young people at all then this tends to be 
in terms of tragedy, negativity and sadness. In contrast, recent developments in feminist, 
queer, postcolonial, disability and death studies have provided new vocabularies for speaking 
of and celebrating the lives and death of ‘non-normative’ human beings (e.g. McRuer, 2006). 
Being disabled is not a tragedy but a possibility, an affirmation, a ‘queer’ or ‘crip’ space for 
rethinking what it means to be human, to live a quality life and a life with quality. Death is a 
difficult subject and discussing the death of a child is more difficult still. Social 
embarrassment around death and disability means that a silence is often imposed upon 
families. However, we need to talk about death before and after a child dies. In what ways 
can we promote valued understandings of real bodies facing death? How can death, disability 
and short lives be conceptualized in less liminal and pathological ways that honour the 
contributions of children with LL/LTIs? How can social sciences articulate the ways in 
which medicine and palliative care value short lives and transform services for children with 
LL/LTIs and their families? To what extent does a consideration of death, disability and 
short lives extend social and natural science understandings of well being and humanity?  
 
While this is not the place (and there is not the space) to adequately answer these questions, 
we might be able to sketch out a theoretical landscape that encourages productive answers. 
Our concern relates to the common assumption that disabled children with LL/LTIs are 
occupying a borderland between life and death, between the human and the inhuman. Like 
asylum seekers and refugees, these children risk being cast out as ‘disposable humanity’ or 
‘undignified monuments of posthuman inhumanity’ (Braidotti, 2013: 127). In contrast, then, 
what we require is a politics of becoming (rather than an assumed positionality of necro-
political destruction) that ‘thinks with rather than against death’ (128, our italics). Children 
with LL/LTIs may be seen as pioneers of a posthuman approach to death that redraws the 
parameters and criteria of what counts as a valued life and death. They conspicuously hit us 
with the reality, held by all members of contemporary society, that ‘we live to recover from 
the shocking awareness that this game [life and living] is over even before it started. The 
proximity to death suspends life, not into transcendence, but rather into the radical 
immanence of ‘just a life’, here and now, for as long as we can and as much as we can take’ 
(Braidotti, 2013: 132). Traditional notions (or notions obsessed with ‘Zoë’ rather than 
thanatos) such as ‘quality of life’, ‘living a full life’, ‘filling a life before death’ are reappraised 
not only through children with LL/LLIs. ‘Death is the event that has always taken place at 
the level of consciousness ’ (that is we are always thinking of death when alive) and ‘life is 
passing and we do not own it; we just inhabit it, not unlike a time-share location’ (133) 
(living is constantly in flux and movement). Death and short lives are pulled from a 
depressive human position into a productive posthuman space because ‘posthuman critical 
thought does not aim at mastery, but at transformation of negative into positive passions’ 
(p134). It can be argued then that ‘life as Zoë also encompasses what we death. As a result, 
what we humans most deeply aspire to is not so much to disappear, but rather to do in the 
space of our own life and in our own way’ (p135).  
 
Unsurprisingly, children and young people with LL/LTIs have plenty to say about how they 
would like to die, how their funerals should be planned and the hopes they have for how 
they are remembered. This latter point hints at their capacities for what Braidotti (2013: 137) 
terms ‘becoming-imperceptible’ ‘part of the cycles of becoming, yet another form of 
interconnectedness, a vital relationship that links one with other multiple forces’ (137). We 
do connect even when we are no longer physically around. Add to this the reality that many 
children with LL/LTIs are plugged into a host of human and non-human assemblages – at 
times test-cases for new medical and technological interventions aimed at preserving life or 
aiding a death with dignity – then our young people are swept into the growing population 
of dynamic non-unitary assemblages. Children-with-LL-LTIs-as-cyborg assemblages are very 
real living examples of posthuman social theory. Death and short lives are no longer read in 
terms of lack nor figuration but in terms of plenitude, desire and possibility: over-flowing 
with hither to unknown future inter-relationships and connections with others. This is not to 
deny the tragedy of young people dying far too early. But it is about inviting an alternative 
conceptualisation of life and death. If we can affirm death, one could argue, we can affirm 
anything. In between the binaries of life and death we find affirmation. This is a matter of 
life and death emboldened by ‘relational vitality’ (188).  
 
(5) Conclusion 
Braidotti (2013: 104) suggests that ‘thinking is about the invention of new concepts and new 
productive ethical relations. In this respect, theory is a form of organised estrangement from 
dominant values’. We share this view and would add that disability captures the productive 
possibilities of the posthuman condition. Disability brings something politicised and critical 
to posthuman theory. Our sense is that disabled people will continue to fight to be 
recognised as humans (in the humanist sense and register of humanism) but equally (and 
simultaneously) are already enacting forms of activism, art and relationality that push us all to 
think imaginatively and critically about a new epoch that we might term the posthuman. 
Disability politics will continue to weave in and out of human and posthuman possibilities 
(Goodley, 2014). Disability disavows the human: it desires and rejects it and in this dynamic, 
necessarily contradictory play with the human. Disability allows us to think again about our 
selves, our relations and our politics. Posthuman disability studies capture the now and 
future of our activism and our thinking. 
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